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Abstract. This paper contributes to the lean versus clean debate by examining whether or 
not monetary policy in South Africa leans against the wind or cleans up after the bubble has 
bust. This is achieved by analysing the behaviour of asset prices during the different phases 
of monetary policy stance. The models that allow the behaviour of the asset prices to differ 
during periods of tight and easy monetary conditions as well as during periods of 
contractionary and expansionary monetary conditions are specified. The results provide 
evidence of an asymmetric behaviour between monetary policy interest rate and asset prices 
during the periods of easy and tight monetary conditions. The empirical results further 
provide evidence of symmetric behaviour between themonetary policy interest rate and 
asset prices during the periods of contractionary and expansionary monetary conditions. 
Thus monetary policy in South Africa supports the proposition of leaning against the wind 
as opposed to the proposition of cleaning up after the bubble has burst. 
Keywords. Lean versus clean debate, Monetary policy regimes, Financial distress. 
JEL. C51, E52, E61, G01. 
 
1. Introduction 
he lean versus clean debate has taken centre stage among policy makers in 
the aftermath of the recent financial crises. According to Issing (2011), the 
prevailing orthodoxy during the tranquil macroeconomic conditions before 
the 2008 global financial crisis, a period that is sometimes referred to as the great 
moderation, embraced the “clean up after the bubble has burst” principle, also 
known as benign neglect or the Jackson Hole consensus. In this period, the 
consensus amongst policy makers was that monetary policy should ignore 
fluctuations in asset prices and potential bubbles, at least to the extent that they do 
notaffect the inflation outlook, and clean up after the bubble has burst to restore 
macroeconomic stability. The defence of this view, including empirical support, is 
provided by Bernanke & Gertler (1999; 2001), Greenspan (2002), Bernanke (2002; 
2009), Gilchrist & Leahy (2002) and Svensson (2010; 2011; 2012), among others. 
The reasons advanced for ignoring asset price developments are that they are 
difficult to identify or measure in real time, thatmonetary policy is too blunt an 
instrument to deal with asset price bubbles without detrimental costs to the 
economy and that targeting asset prices would introduce moral hazard and 
indeterminacy of inflation. 
The recent global financial crisis has demonstrated that the consensus of benign 
neglect during the era of great moderation may no longer be valid as assert Gali & 
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Gambertti (2013). It has strengthened the alternative viewpoint that central banks 
should “lean against the wind” whichsuggests that central banks shouldpay close 
attention and systematically react to asset price misalignments. According to 
Trichet (2005), leaning against the wind necessitates raising the monetary policy 
interest ratewhen asset price booms are identified andat times even beyond the 
level necessary to maintain price stability. Mishkin (2011) argues that the case for 
the leaning against the wind has become much stronger as opposed to benign 
neglect which is proposed by supporters of cleaning up after the bubble has burst. 
The defence of this view, including empirical support, is provided by Cecchetti et 
al. (2000; 2003), Borio & White (2004), Borio (2007; 2011; 2014), Taylor (2008), 
Trichet (2005; 2009), Curdia & Woodford (2009) and Woodford (2012) and 
Mishkin (2009; 2011), among others. The arguments for leaning against the wind 
are thatoutput gaps, natural rates of unemployment and interest rates are 
unobservable and are measured with great uncertainty, that inflation and output 
stability does not ensure financial stability given that financial crises can manifest 
during periods of stable macroeconomic conditions and that unwinding financial 
crises can be unpredictable and costly.  
The proposition that monetary policy should lean against the wind suggested by 
Trichet (2005), Woodford (2012), and Borio (2014), among others, where 
monetary policy is tightened during asset price booms and loosened during the 
asset price bursts implies symmetric behaviour between the monetary policy 
interest rate and asset price misalignments. The reason for the symmetric 
relationship between the monetary policy interest rate and asset price 
misalignments is that the monetary authorities react by systematically raising the 
monetary policy interest rate to help restrain the build up of financial imbalances 
and by adopting an accommodatory monetary policy stanceduring periods of bursts 
in asset prices. According to Trichet (2005), by reacting more symmetrically, 
increasing the monetary policy interest rate during periods of booming asset prices 
and decreasing the monetary policy interest rate during periods of asset prices 
bursts, the monetary authorities discourage excessive risktaking and 
overinvestment during the periods of asset price booms, while the opposite is true 
during the periods of asset prices bursts. Thus when monetary policy leans against 
the wind, the monetary authorities monitor and react to asset price misalignments 
consistently and systematically in periods of both asset price booms and bursts. 
On the contrary, the proposition that monetary policy should clean up after the 
bubble has burst suggested by Greenspan (2002; 2010) and Yellen (2009), 
Bernanke (2009), among others, where monetary policy is restricted and passive to 
asset price misalignments during the buildup phase of asset price bubbles and is 
loosened aggressively once the asset price bubble has burst implies asymmetric 
behaviour of monetary policy interest rates during the periods of asset price booms 
and bursts.The reason for the asymmetric relationship between the monetary policy 
interest rates and asset price misalignments is that the monetary authority ignores 
asset price misalignments during periods of booming asset prices and cleans up by 
reacting to asset price misalignments during the periods after the asset price bubble 
has burst.Furthermore, thesuggestionthat monetary policy should clean up after the 
asset price bubbles have burst suggests threshold behaviour by monetary 
authorities with regard to asset price misalignments in that the monetary authorities 
react to asset price misalignments only in their burst phase while no attention is 
paid to the booming phase of the asset price misalignments. Theprinciple of 
cleaning up after the bubble has burst, including empirical support, is provided by 
Borio & Lowe (2004), De Graeve (2008), Stiglitz (2009), Mishkin (2009) and 
Goodhart et al. (2009), among others. In particular, Mishkin (2009) argues that 
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nonlinearity best describes the cleanupprinciplein that a negative interest rate 
shockis likely to have a larger effect on asset prices than a positive one.   
This paper contributes to the lean versus clean debate by examining whether or 
not monetary policy in South Africa leans against the wind or cleans up after the 
bubble has bust. This is achieved by analysing the behaviour of asset prices during 
the different phases of monetary policy stance in South Africa.Theasset price 
developmentsare captured using a composite indicator of financial distress that 
collects and synthesises information from the main segments of the South African 
financial market, including the bond and equity securities markets, thecommodities 
market and the foreign exchange market. This indicator is constructed and 
described in detail in the next section. To capture the asymmetric behaviour by 
monetary authorities with regard to asset price misalignments, the models with 
various regime switching behaviours suggested by Terasvirta (1994; 1998) and 
Van Dijk et al. (2002; 2003) are specified. These models allow for determination of 
the behaviour of the composite indicator of financial distress during periods of tight 
and easy monetary conditions, or the periods of high and low monetary policy 
interest rate, respectively.The models also allow for the determination of the 
behaviour of the composite indicator of financial distress during periods of 
contractionary and expansionary monetary conditions, or the periods of decreasing 
and increasing monetary policy interest rate, respectively. Consequently, this paper 
contributes to the clean versus clean debate by providing evidence of whether 
monetary policy in South Africa leans against the wind or cleans after the asset 
price bubbles have burst. 
The global financial crisis has demonstrated that asset prices play an important 
role in macroeconomic fluctuations hence there is notable resurgence inthe 
literatureon the role of asset price misalignments in macroeconomic 
fluctuations.Notable contributions include Edwards & Vegh (1997), Kiyotaki & 
Moore (1997), Bernanke & Gertler (1999; 2001), Bernanke et al. (1999), Gertler & 
Karadi (2009), Gertler & Kiyotaki (2011), Christiano et al. (2010), Curdia & 
Woodford (2010; 2011) and Woodford (2012). This literature introduces financial 
fictions into the standard general equilibrium models. However, despite the 
significant advances in financial frictions literature, there is still no generally 
agreed framework to incorporate developments in financial markets into standard 
macroeconomic models. Additionally, Borio (2012) and Issing (2011), among 
others, contend that the literature on financial frictions mainly integrates individual 
financial market variables such as credit and house pricesinto standard 
macroeconomic models rather than acomprehensive measure that captures the 
financial market as a whole. In South Africa, the literature on financial fictions 
includes Liu & Seeiso (2012), whilerelated contributions include Naraidoo & 
Raputsoane (2010), Kasai & Naraidoo (2012) as well as Naraidoo & Paya (2012) 
who find a statistically significant relationship between the monetary policy 
interest rate and the index of financial conditions in South Africa. 
Borio & White (2004) and Gali & Gambetti (2014) contend that financial 
imbalances cannot build up without some form of excessive monetary 
accommodation and hence argue that understanding how monetary policy reacts to 
asset prices is imperative. Thus the severity of the recent global financial crisis has 
rekindled the debate of whether monetary policy should lean against the wind or 
clean up after the bubble has burst. The literature on the lean versus clean debate 
includes Cecchetti et al. (2000; 2003), Borio & Lowe (2004), Cecchetti & Li 
(2008), Drehmann et al. (2012), Baxa et al. (2013), Gali (2013) as well as Gali & 
Gambetti (2014). In particular, Cecchetti et al. (2000; 2003) provide evidence that 
incorporating asset prices directly into central banks‟ reaction function smoothens 
the path for output and inflation, while Borio & Lowe (2004) find an asymmetric 
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response of monetary policy to the buildup and unwinding of financial imbalances 
using data from 20 industrialised countries. Cecchetti & Li (2008) provide 
evidencethat monetary policy at the Federal Reserve neutralises the procyclicality 
of bank capital requirements, while the opposite is true in Germany and Japan, 
while Baxa et al. (2013) find that central banks in developed economies 
asymmetrically decrease monetary policy rates during the periods of high financial 
distress.On the contrary, Gali (2013) and Gali & Gambetti (2014) provide evidence 
that the increase in stock prices is persistent following tightening of monetary 
policy conditions in the United States. 
This paper is organised as follows. The next section is data description, 
followed by the specification of the empirical model. Then is the discussion of the 
empirical results and last is the conclusion.  
 
2. Data description 
Monthly data spanning the period of January 2000 to December 2013 is used in 
estimation and it is sourced from the South African Reserve Bank database. The 
repurchase rate, also known as the repo rate, is the monetary policy rate in South 
Africaand it measures the nominal monetary policy interest rate. The indicator of 
financial distress is approximated using a composite measurethat collects and 
synthesises information from the main segments of the South African financial 
market, including bond and equity securities markets, foreign exchange market as 
well as the money and commodity markets.The indicator of financial distress 
captures the interruption of the normal functioning of the financial markets. This 
interruption is characterised by increased uncertainty about the fundamental value 
of financial assets, increased information asymmetry and heightened aversion from 
holding risky and liquid assets resulting in liquidity shortages as well as significant 
shifts in asset prices. A similar indicator of financial distress has been constructed 
by Illing & Liu (2006), Balakrishnan et al. (2009), Cardarelli et al. (2009), Hakkio 
& Keeton (2009), Lo Duca & Peltonen (2011), Borio (2012), Cevik et al. (2012), 
Raputsoane (2014), among others. Kliesen et al. (2012) provides a survey of the 
literatureon indicators of financial distressand find that, although they are different 
in their construction,the correlation between themis high given that each of the 
indexes measure the same thing in principle. 
The selection of the variables used to construct the indicator of financial distress 
relied heavily on existing literature and on their relevance and the availability of 
data.The variables and their descriptions arepresented in Table 1. Theycomprisethe 
interbank spread, Future spread, Sovereign bond spread, A rated bond spread, 
Corporate bond spread, stock market return, Financial sector return, Banking sector 
return, Financial sector beta, Banking sector beta, Nominal effective exchange rate 
return, Credit extension growth, Property market return, Commodity market return, 
Oil market return and VIX S&P500 volatility index.The financial distress variables 
were standardised and then aggregated using the principal components analysis 
weighting scheme. The standardisation involved demeaning all the variables by 
subtracting their means and then dividing them by their respective standard 
deviations. As such, a value of 1 in each one of these variablesrepresents a 1 
standard deviation difference from their mean value over the sample period.  
 
Table 1. Financial distress indicator variables 
Variable Description 
Interbank spread  Spread between the 3 month Johannesburg Interbank 
Agreed Rate (JIBAR) rates and the 3 month Treasury bill 
rate 
Future spread Spread between the 3 month Forward Rate Agreements 
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(FRAs) and the 3 month treasury bill rate 
Government bond spread   
Spread between the yield on 3 year government bond and 
the yield on 10 year government bond 
A rated bond spread   
Spread between the yield on A rated Eskom bond and the 
yield on 10 year government bond 
Corporate bond spread  
Spread between the FTSE/JSE All Bond yield and the yield 
on 10 year government bond 
Stock market return   Annual change in the FTSE/JSE All Share stock market 
index 
Financial sector return   Annual change in the FTSE/JSE Financials stock market 
index 
Banking sector return   Annual change in the FTSE/JSE Banks stock market index 
Financial sector beta   CAPM beta of the one year rolling window of the annual 
FTSE/JSE Financials stock market index returns 
Banking sector beta   CAPM beta of the one year rolling window of the annual 
FTSE/JSE Banks stock market index returns 
Nominal eff. exchange rate return   Annual change in nominal effective exchange rate 
Credit extension growth   Annual change in total private credit extension 
Property market return   Annual change in the average price of all houses compiled 
by the ABSA bank 
Commodity market return   Annual change in the Economist‟s commodity price index 
Oil market return   Annual change in the Brent crude oil price 
VIX S&P500   Chicago Board‟s implied volatility of the S&P 500 index 
Notes: Own calculation with data from the South African Reserve Bank database. 
 
Figure 1 depicts the evolutions of the repurchase rate and the indicator of 
financial distress. The repurchase rate dropped somewhat at the beginning of 2001 
but started to rise again later in the same year reaching a peak in late 2002. It then 
dropped dramatically from early 2003 reaching a low in early 2005. From early 
2006, the repurchase rate increased steadily and peaked in the middle 2008 before 
it dropped again dramatically to late 2010 where it remained range bound to the 
end of the sample. The movements in the composite indicator of financial distress 
is comparable to those constructed in the literature by Illing & Liu (2006), 
Balakrishnan et al. (2009), Cardarelli et al. (2009), Hakkio & Keeton (2009), Lo 
Duca & Peltonen (2011), Borio (2012) and Cevik et al. (2012), among others. The 
only notable exception is that the indicators of financial distress for developed 
countries show relatively heightened financial distress that peak in late 2011 as a 
result of the sovereign debt crisis. This observation is supported by Kliesen et al. 
(2012) who survey the literature on financial stress indexes by comparing the 
datasets from which they are constructed and provide evidence that these indexes 
are highly correlated since they approximate a similar principle. 
The movements in repurchase rate are closely mirrored by the movements in the 
indicator of financial distress where there are two distinct peaks in the indicator of 
financial distress in 2003 and 2008. The 2003 peak in the indicator of financial 
distress is associated with the sustained increase in financial distress since 2000 
following the tech bubble, the Enron scandals, the rand rapiddepreciation and the 
9/11 attacks in 2001. These events were followed by the war on terror and the 
depreciation and the 9/11 attacks in 2001. These events were followed by the war 
on terror and the South American economic crisis in 2002 as well as the market 
jitters as a result of the war in Iraq in 2003. The 2008 peak in the indicator of 
financial distress is preceded by the sustained increase in this indicator from 2006 
as a result of turn in US‟s housing market that resulted in chain of events that 
exposed fragilities in the financial system resulting in the subprime crisis in late 
2007. 
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(i) Repurchase rate (ii) Financial distress indicator 
  
Figure 1. Evolution of the main variables 
Notes: Own calculation with data from the South African Reserve Bank database. 
 
These events were followed by the subsequent dramatic fall in the indicator from 
late 2008 as mortgage companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as well as the 
world biggest banks Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, 
resulting in the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The 
indicator of financial distress then remained range bound to the end of the sample.  
 
3. Empirical model 
Many macroeconomic variables tend to behave differently during the periods of 
expansions and upturns as opposed to the periods of contractions and downturns. 
The evidence of this salient behaviour of macroeconomic variables is provided by 
Sims & Zha (2004), Davig (2004), Hamilton (2005), Hamilton (2008) and Borio 
(2012) who observe that the expansions and upturns in many macroeconomic 
variablesare normallygradual and protractedand are often followed byabrupt and 
dramatic contractions and downturns.The variants of the Logistic smooth transition 
autoregressive (LSTAR) model are used to capture the behaviour of the indicator 
of financial distress during the different monetary policy regimes. The LSTAR 
model was proposed by Terasvirta (1994; 1998) and Van Dijk et al. (2002; 2003) 
and is specified as follows 
 
    
    
1 1
1 1
... 1 , , + ,   
... , , + ,   
L L t d Lm t t tt m d
t
H H t d Hm t t tt m d
Y Y G Z Z
Y
Y Y G Z Z
      
      
  
  
     
 
   
   (1) 
where 
  
1
( , , ) 1 expt tG P Z Z   

           (2) 
and  
 1 2 1 1...t t t m t m dZ X X X              (3) 
 
tY is the regime switching variable, tX  is the transition or threshold variable, 
while  G   is the monotonic transition function that is bounded between 0 and 1, 
specified as a logistic function with a threshold variable, tZ  is the threshold 
variable,  is the smoothing parameter that determines the speed and smoothness of 
transition between regimes and  measures the threshold location.  are the 
model parameters, while the threshold parameters are  . m is the embedding 

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dimension, d  is the time delay and the „low‟ and „high‟ regimes are L  and H , 
respectively.  
More specifically,the LSTAR model is specified as follows in this instance 
 
    
    
1 1
1 1
... 1 , , + ,   
... , , + ,   
L L t d Lm t t tt m d
t
H H t d Hm t t tt m d
FDI FDI G Z Z
FDI
FDI FDI G Z Z
      
      
  
  
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
 

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  (4) 
 
where 
 
  
1
( , , ) 1 expt tG P Z Z   

           (5) 
 
and  
 
 
 
1 2 1 1
1 2 1 1
...
...
t t m t m d
t
t t m t m d
RPR RPR RPR
Z
RPR RPR RPR
  
  
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  

 
      

     (6) 
 
tFDI is the indicator of financial distress, which is the regime switching 
variable. G is the monotonic logistic transition function with a threshold or 
threshold variable tZ and is bounded between 0 and 1. tRPR and tRPR  are the 
repurchase rate and the change in the repurchase rate, respectively.The different 
types of regime switching behaviours can be specified depending on how the 
logistic function  , ,tG Z    is specified. As such, the LSTAR model can take 
different forms. In the event that the transition variable is in levels t t dZ X  , the 
model distinguishes between periods of high and low levels in the transition 
variable. Enders & Granger (1998) also suggest that the model can distinguish 
between periods of upturns and downturns in the transition variable when the 
transition variable is first differences t t dZ X    hence the model behaves 
differently when the transition variable is increasing and when it is decreasing.  
In this particular instance, the model distinguishes between the periods of tight 
and easy monetary policy conditions when the transition variable is specified as  
 
  
1
1 exp tG RPR 

           (7) 
 
The tight monetary policy stance describes the periods of high interest rates and 
easymonetary policy stance describe the periods of low interest rates. The 
transition variable in this instance is the level of the repurchase rate tRPR . This 
model is referred to as the model with tRPR  transition variable hereafter.The 
model also distinguishes between contractionaryand expansionary phases of 
monetary policy when the transition function is specified as 
 
  
1
1 exp tG RPR 

            (8) 
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The contractionary and expansionary phases of monetary policy describe the 
periods of increasing and decreasing interest rates, respectively. The transition 
variable in this instance is the change in the repurchase rate tRPR . This model is 
referred to as the model with tRPR  transition variable hereafter. Thus the study 
will establish how the indicator of financial distress behaves during the periods of 
high and low monetary policy interest rate as well as during the periods of 
increasing and decreasing monetary policy interest rate. For a more detailed 
discussion on specification and the various forms of Threshold Autoregressive 
models, see Terasvirta (1994;1998), van Dijk et al. (2002; 2003). 
 
3. Empirical results 
The specified variants of the LSTAR model were estimated using the algorithm 
by Aznarte et al. (2013). The first step in estimation involvedcarrying out the 
linearity test of full order LSTAR model against full order autoregressive (AR) 
model at different values of the time delay parameter. According to Terasvirta 
(1994) and van Dijk & Terasvirta (2002), in the event that the null hypothesis of 
linearity is rejected, the next step involves performing additional tests to choose 
between the LSTAR model and the Exponential Smooth Transition Autoregressive 
(ESTAR) model. The choice between the LSTAR model and the ESTAR model 
can also be done as a post estimation exercise through the use of model evaluation 
criteria. The detailed steps tochoose between the LSTAR model and the ESTAR 
model are detailed in Terasvirta (1994) and van Dijk & Terasvirta (2002). The 
results for the test of linearity of the full order AR model at different values of the 
time delay parameter are presented in Table 2. Linearity in the full order LSTAR 
model is rejected most significant when the time delay parameter is 2 for both the 
model with tRPR  transition variable, which distinguishes between periods oftight 
and the easy monetary policy, and the model with tRPR  transition variable, 
which distinguishes between periods of contractionary and the expansionary 
monetary policy. 
 
Table 2. Nonlinearity test and the optimal time delay parameter 
 
(i) Model with tRPR transition variable (ii) Model with tRPR  
transition variable 
 _Spec test
 
P Value
 
_Spec test
 
P Value
 
1d   5.39284 0.018952 0.10622 0.238072 
2d   6.56306 0.008918 0.309752 0.182584 
3d   6.34839 0.03472 0.267620 0.269037 
4d   4.36960 0.112515 0.11019 0. 417264 
Notes:  _Spec testis the test for nonlinearity of the full order LSTAR model against full order AR 
model, which is the F-test with associated p-values, under the null hypothesis of linearity. This test 
also doubles as the test for the optimal time delay parameter, 1,2,..,d n ,  determined where the test 
for linearity is rejected most significantly. More details on conducting these tests can be found in 
Terasvirta (1994) and van Dijk and Terasvirta (2002). 
 
Additional tests to choose between the LSTAR model and the ESTAR model 
were not performed in this study given that the transition functions for the two 
models adjust differently to the deviations of the regime switching variable around 
the threshold level. The study aims to analyse how asset prices behave during the 
different phases of monetary policy stance. The logistic transition function adjusts 
asymmetrically, or at different speeds, above and below the threshold level. The 
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exponential transition function adjusts symmetrically, or the same speed, above and 
below threshold level. Therefore the transition function that adjusts asymmetrically 
above and below the threshold level is more appropriate. The estimation results 
also show statistically significant asymmetries in the behaviour of financial stress 
during the different phases of monetary policy stance, which favours the use of the 
LSTAR model as opposed to the ESTAR model.  
The empirical results and measures of model adequacy for the estimated 
variants of the LSTAR model are presented in Table 3. Given that the LSTAR 
model is specified in an autoregressive manner, this necessitates determining the 
lag order of the estimated models. The determination of the lag order involved 
using the Akaike information criterion, the Bayesian information criterion and the 
Hannan Quin information criterion.These criteria pointed to the lag order of 1. In 
addition, to assess the robustness of the estimated LSTAR models, the residual 
variance, the Akaike information criterion and the mean absolute percentage error, 
which is the forecasting accuracy measure, were implemented.The grid search, 
which involves estimating the model for a grid of different values of the threshold 
variable and selecting the best fit as the threshold estimate, was also implemented 
to determine the threshold values for both models. The Akaike information 
criterion, the mean absolute percentage error and the residual variance all point to 
the model with tRPR  transition variable as the preferred model.  
 
Table 3. Logistic smooth transition autoregressive model results 
 (i) Model with tRPR transition variable (ii) Model with tRPR transition variable 
 Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error 
L  0.441991 0.119410*** -0.501185 0.183475*** 
1L  
1.064361 0.063335*** 0.933720 0.055681*** 
H  
-0.547978 0.241799** 0.880628 0.348681** 
1H  
-0.778892 0.117233*** -0.220190 0.108352 ** 
  10.589489 4.073608** 23.845582 27.78862 
 
  9.34830 0.062852*** 0.057952 0.078907 
AIC  96.00000  14.00000  
Mape  257.100  182.4000  
_Rsd Var
 
1.59400  0.864700  
_Rm Lin
 
9.581232 (0.325157) 2.106685 (0.00123) 
_Pr Cnst
 
2.9154589 (0.2755115) 5.812323 (0.447052) 
Notes: Statistical significance codes: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%. AIC is the Akaike Information 
criterion, Mape  is the mean absolute percentage error, _Rsd Var is the variance of the residuals,
_Rm Lin  and _Pr Cnst are the tests for no remaining nonlinearity and parameter constancy, 
respectively, with associated p-values in parentheses.More details on conducting these tests can be 
found in Terasvirta (1994) and van Dijk & Terasvirta (2002). 
 
The null hypothesis of no remaining nonlinearity and parameter constancy are 
accepted for the model with 
tRPR  transition variable. However, this hypothesis is 
rejected for the model with 
tRPR  transition variable. In addition, the null 
hypothesis of parameter constancy is accepted for both models with 
tRPR
 transition 
variable and 
tRPR transition variable. The parameter that measures the speed and 
smoothness of transition between the low and high regimes in the transition 
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variable is 10.59 for the model with 
tRPR  transition variable, while it is 23.85 for 
the model with 
tRPR  transition variable. This implies a relatively smooth and 
slow speed of adjustment for the model with 
tRPR  transition variable compared to 
the model with tRPR  transition variable between the high and the low regimes. 
The transition between regimes in the model with 
tRPR  transition variable is 
relatively abrupt given the relatively high parameter that measures the speed and 
smoothness of transition between the low and high regimes. The transition function 
for the model with 
tRPR  transition variable is statistically insignificant. However, 
it is important to note that the statistical significance of the transition functions is 
often not a concern and is seldom reported. Thus, the parameter measuring the 
speed and smoothness of transition is often allowed to be dimension free as 
suggested by Terasvirta (1994), given that its size points to the various forms of the 
transition function. 
The results of the model with tRPR  transition variable are reported in Table 3, 
panel (i). This model distinguishes between the periods of tight and easy monetary 
conditions. The grid search finds a statistically significant threshold at 9.34 percent. 
The statistical significance in this threshold level means that the indicator of 
financial distress behaves differently when the repurchase rate is above this 
threshold level as opposed to when it is below or equal to this threshold level. This 
means that the values of the repurchase rate above this threshold level describe 
tight monetary conditions, while the values of the repurchase rate below or equal to 
this threshold describe easy monetary conditions. The results further show that the 
indicator of financial distress increases by a statistically significant 1.06 percent 
relative to its recent past during the periods of easy monetary conditions, while 
itdecreases by a statistically significant 0.79 percent relative to its recent past 
during the periods of tight monetary conditions. This means that the indicator of 
financial distress increases at a relatively faster pace in periods of easymonetary 
conditions and decreases at a relatively slower pace in periods of tight monetary 
conditions. 
The results ofthe model with tRPR  transition variable are reported in Table 3, 
panel (ii).This model distinguishes between the periods of contractionary and 
expansionary monetary conditions. The grid search finds a threshold at 0.06 
percent. This means that the values of the change in repurchase rate above this 
threshold describe tight monetary conditions, while the values of the change in the 
repurchase rate below or equal this threshold describe easy monetary conditions. 
However, this threshold is not statistically significant. The statistical insignificance 
in this threshold level means that there is no discernible difference in the behaviour 
of the indicator of financial distress when the repurchase rate is above this 
threshold level as opposed to when it is below or equal to this threshold level. The 
results further show that the indicator of financial distress increase by a statistically 
significant 0.93 percent relative to its recent past during the periods of 
contractionary monetary conditions, while it decreases by a statistically significant 
0.22 percent relative to its recent past during the periods of expansionary monetary 
conditions.This result means that the indicator of financial distress increases at a 
marginallyfaster pace in periods of contractionary monetaryconditions and 
decreases at a relatively slower pace in periods of expansionarymonetary 
conditions. 
In summary, theempirical results of the model with tRPR  transition variable 
have provided evidence that the indicator of financial distress decreases in periods 
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of tight monetary conditions and increases in periods of easy monetary conditions. 
The positive growth in the indicator of financial distress during the periods of easy 
monetary conditionssupports the view that accommodative monetary policy lays 
the foundation for financial crises to manifest as argue Borio and White (2004) and 
Taylor (2008), among others.The empirical results of the model with tRPR  
transition variable have provided evidence that the indicator of financial distress 
increases in periods of contractionary monetary policy conditions and decreases in 
periods of expansionary monetary conditions. Of particular interest is the statistical 
insignificance of the threshold level in the results of the model with tRPR  
transition variable, which is the model that distinguishes between the periods of 
contractionary and expansionary monetary conditions. The implication of this 
finding for the lean versus clean debate is that monetary policy in South Africa 
supports the proposition of leaning against the windas opposed to cleaning up after 
the bubble has burst. This is contrary to the findings by Borio & Lowe (2004) and 
Baxa et al. (2013) who provide evidence of asymmetric response of monetary 
policy to the build-up and unwinding of financial imbalances in developed 
economies. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has contributed to the lean versus clean debate by examining 
whether or not monetary policy in South Africa leans against the wind or cleans up 
after the bubble has bust. The behaviour of asset prices were analysedover the 
different phases of monetary policy stance in South Africa. The asset price 
developments were captured using a composite indicator of financial distress that 
collects and synthesises information from the main segments of the South African 
financial market, including bond and equity securities markets, thecommodities 
market and the foreign exchange market. The models with different regime 
switching that allow for the determination of the behaviour of asset prices during 
periods of tight and easy monetary conditions as well as during periods of 
contractionary and expansionary monetary conditions, were specified. The 
empirical results have provided evidence of asymmetric behaviour of asset prices 
misalignments in periods of tight andeasy monetary conditions. In particular, the 
empirical results have shown that the indicator of financial distress decreases in 
periods of tight monetary conditions and increases in periods of easy monetary 
conditions. The empirical results further provide evidence of symmetric behaviour 
of asset price misalignmentsduring periods of contractionary and expansionary 
monetary conditions. In particular, the indicator of financial distress increases in 
periods of contractionary monetary policy conditions and decreases in periods of 
expansionary monetary conditions. The results have also provided evidence of 
statistical insignificant threshold level in the model that distinguishes between the 
periods of contractionary and expansionary monetary conditions. The implications 
of the results for the lean versus clean debate is that monetary policy in south 
Africa supports the proposition of leaning against the wind as opposed to the 
proposition of cleaning up after the bubble has burst. 
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